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THE APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
TO CONDUCT OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES: A VIEW FROM ABROAD
JS. Stanfordt
"It is axiomatic that in anti-trust matters the policy of one state may be to
defend what it is the policy of another state to attack." Lord Wilberforce in
Westinghouse I
It is important at the outset to put in the proper context the problems that
have arisen between Canada and the United States in the area of antitrust
enforcement. The close corporate links that exist between major elements of
the Canadian and U.S. economies, reflecting the high degree of U.S. equity
investment in such vital areas of the Canadian economy as the resource and
industrial sectors,2 yield significant benefits for Canada but also present cer-
tain problems, notably in the area of antitrust. Fortunately for Canadians,
the United States has a well-developed and vigorously enforced system of
domestic antitrust law. The pattern of commercial conduct that this re-
quires of the U.S. private sector has an effect on the conduct of U.S. corpo-
rations when they enter the Canadian economy. Because the antitrust
policies of our two countries are so similar in their broad fundamental
objectives, this spillover effect is welcomed in Canada as beneficial. My col-
leagues in the Canadian Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs
have spoken of the serious problems they would experience if they had to
enforce Canadian anti-combines legislation next door to a cartelized U.S.
economy.
t Director General, Bureau of Commercial and Commodity Relations, Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs, Ottawa. Formerly Director, Legal Advisory Division, Department of External
Affairs. Member of the Alberta Bar. The views expressed herein are solely the personal views
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of External Affairs or
of the Canadian Government.
1. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 94
(H.L. 1977).
2. See INFORMATION CANADA, FOREIGN DIREcT INVESTMENT IN CANADA 20 (1972).
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To be sure, differences have arisen between Canada and the United
States in the past over attempts to enforce U.S. antitrust laws in Canada.
These differences have been the result less of fundamental conflicts of gov-
ernment economic policy than of a more general concern over U.S. anti-
trust investigations into activities within Canada. In an attempt to recognize
and avoid these problems, the Fulton-Rogers understanding 3 of 1959 pro-
vided that "in the future, discussions will be held between the two govern-
ments at the appropriate stage when it becomes apparent that interests in
one of our countries are likely to be affected by the enforcement of the
antitrust laws of the other."'4
The close collaboration between U.S. antitrust and Canadian anti-
combines officials which grew out of this arrangement appreciably reduced
the friction generated by extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. This
bilateral cooperation was taken a step further by the 1969 Basford-Mitchell
understanding,5 which provided for the exchange of information between
Canadian and U.S. antitrust authorities and reaffirmed the intention of the
two governments to apply in their bilateral relations the 1967 OECD rec-
ommendation on restrictive business practices.6
These two understandings have served both countries well, and neither
country desires to impair their effectiveness. Quite the contrary, Canada
strongly desires to maintain and enhance the kind of cooperation envisaged
by the Fulton-Rogers and Basford-Mitchel arrangements. But to enable
our antitrust collaboration to grow into new areas we must first resolve a
new and somewhat different problem that has arisen between us as a result
of recent efforts by the United States to apply its antitrust laws to conduct in
Canada and other countries.
I
A NEW KIND OF PROBLEM
If the issues in our present differences are to be correctly identified and
resolved, we must recognize that the problem we are now dealing with has a
new dimension distinguishing it from previous bilateral antitrust issues.
The Fulton-Rogers and Basford-Mitchell arrangements were directed at the
anticompetitive conduct undertaken by private corporations on their own
3. Seegenerall, [1959] 1 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEB. 617-19 (Can.) (statement of Hon. E.D.
Fulton, then Minister of Justice).
4. Id at 619.
5. The understanding was announced and described in U.S. Dep't of Justice, Joint State-
ment (press release, Nov. 3, 1969) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law
Journal).
6. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RECOMMENDATION
OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRIC-
TIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Oct. 5, 1967).
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initiative to increase corporate profits. Public statements by senior officials
of the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division in 1976, however, indi-
cated a new emphasis and direction in the Foreign Commerce Section's
enforcement policy toward conduct outside the United States.7 This new
policy was "codified" for the guidance of antitrust lawyers and their clients,
both in the United States and abroad, in a document issued by the U.S.
Department of Justice in January 1977 entitled Antitrust Guide for Interna-
tional Operations8 (the Guide). These statements and the Guide gave notice
of an intention on the part of U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities to as-
sert a degree of jurisdiction over activities occurring in other countries that
appeared to go well beyond that which had been reflected in the Antitrust
Division's prior enforcement policy. Not only did the new policy assert very
broad claims to personal and subject matter jurisdiction over activities
outside the United States, but more importantly, it gave notice of an inten-
tion to invoke U.S. antitrust law against activities outside the United States
undertaken in compliance with or in response to foreign government poli-
cies.
A. THE CANADA-UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
To appreciate the significance for Canada of the assertions of extra-
territorial jurisdiction in the Antitrust Division's statements and Guide, one
must assess their potential impact in the context of the unique economic
relationship between Canada and the United States. American individuals
and corporations have made very substantial equity investments in the Ca-
nadian economy, presumably because they find such investments profit-
able.9 A large portion of this investment is in the economically and
politically sensitive resource and industrial development sectors. 10 There is,
therefore, a very large U.S. presence in vital areas of the Canadian econ-
omy.
Another significant dimension of the relationship must be kept in mind.
The United States exports less than 10 percent of its gross national prod-
uct.I' Canada, in contrast, exports over 20 percent of its GNP. 12 Moreover,
7. Seenotes 15-22 infraand accompanying text.
8. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE], reprinted in ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-I (1977) andTRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 266,
pt. 11 (1977).
9. See generally Canadian Foreign Investment Screening Procedures and the Role of Foreign
Investment in the Canadian Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Eco-
nomic Relationships of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-1976).
10. See INFORMATION CANADA, supra note 2, at 20.
11. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT BUS., Dec. 1977, at S-I (United States 1976 gross national product (GNP) was $1,706.5
billion; exports totaled $162.9 billion).
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about 70 percent of all Canadian exports are purchased in the United
States.13 The United States purchases over 20 percent of its total imports
from Canada-more than from any other country. 14
Two particularly relevant consequences follow from this unique bilateral
investment and trading relationship. First, the implementation of Canadian
economic policy in such sensitive areas as resource and industrial develop-
ment will require certain conduct not only of Canadians but also of U.S.
firms and their affiliates operating in Canada. If relations between the Ca-
nadian Government and the private sector are good, the conduct required
to implement economic policy will be determined after consultation be-
tween business and government. Compliance with a policy that the Govern-
ment has determined to be in the national interest will, in many instances,
be ensured by means which fall short of the imposition of a formal legal
obligation. The effective functioning of this kind of business-government
relationship requires more than a government that is sensitive to the con-
cerns of the private sector; it also requires a private sector that is responsive
to the policies of government and will generally conform to those policies
without having to be threatened with prosecution, fines, and imprisonment.
Effective management of a complex industrial economy cannot rest upon
legislated sanctions alone.
The second consequence following from the nature of the Canada-
United States economic relationship is that, because Canada exports such a
large proportion of its production, because so many of those exports are
purchased in the United States, and because Canada is the largest source of
U.S. imports, any Canadian economic policy affecting a Canadian com-
modity or product that is to enter international trade is very likely to have a
significant impact in the United States. This consequence is unavoidable,
and very often it will benefit the U.S. consumer. But sometimes it will not,
because the policies in question are formulated to protect and promote Ca-
nadian economic interests, which do not always coincide with those of the
United States.
12. See CutR anr ECONOMIC ANALYSIS DIVISION, STATISTICS CANADA, CANADIAN STA-
TISTICAL REV., Dec. 1977, at 8, 11 (Canadian GNP was $190.03 billion; exports totaled $38.15
billion).
13. Id at 114 (1976 Canadian exports totaled $38.15 billion, of which $25.80 billion were
exported to United States).
14. See SuRVEY OF CuRRENT Bus., supra note 11, at S-23 (U.S. 1976 imports totaled
$120.68 billion, of which $26.24 billion were imported from Canada). Imports into the United
States from other countries during 1976, expressed as a percentage of total U.S. imports, were:
from Japan, 12.8 percent; from the Federal Republic of Germany, 4.6 percent; from the United
Kingdom, 3.5 percent; and from Italy and France, just over 2 percent. See id
EXTRA TERRTORLL APPLICATION
B. THE NEW U.S. ENFORCEMENT POLICY
It is in the context of this very intense economic relationship, with exten-
sive intercorporate links and a large volume of trade in both directions, that
we must assess the implications for Canada of the claims of antitrust juris-
diction asserted in the U.S. Antitrust Division's statements and Guide. The
following passages indicate in general terms the genesis of the problem. For
example, the Guide states:
U.S. law in general, and the U.S. antitrust laws in particular, are not limited
to transactions which take place within our borders. When foreign transac-
tions have a substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, they are
subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place....
.. . [T]o use the Sherman Act to restrain or punish an overseas conspiracy
whose clear purpose and effect is to restrain significant commerce in the U.S.
market is both appropriate and necessary to effective U.S. enforcement.15
The sole test ofjurisdiction is effect on U.S. commerce, and this effect, once
established, allegedly confers U.S. jurisdiction over conduct wherever it oc-
curs. Douglas E. Rosenthal, Chief of the U.S. Antitrust Division's Foreign
Commerce Section, has stated that
a conspiracy, even if entered into abroad among foreigners, is subject to the
U.S. antitrust laws if it has the intended and actual effect of restraining
United States domestic orforeign commerce. 16
"Conspiracy" is an emotive word. In ordinary usage, people "conspire" to
do bad things, not good things, and one who attempts to justify a conspir-
acy has a heavy onus to discharge. But in some situations the acts com-
plained of may have been directed or encouraged by a government. In such
cases is it accurate or conducive to useful analysis to characterize a
democratically-elected government as a "conspirator" for discharging its re-
sponsibility to ensure the continued viability of an important domestic re-
source or manufacturing industry?
Joel Davidow, former Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of the An-
titrust Division, U.S. Justice Department, has also noted the effort to extend
U.S. law extraterritorially on the basis of the domestic effects of conduct
abroad.
U.S. antitrust officials have generally believed that the broad and even extra-
territorial scope of our antitrust laws, our long-arm statutes, our courts' will-
ingness to pierce corporate veils, and, most importantly, the attractiveness
and size of our national market, have enabled us to be quite successful in
policing and controlling those restrictive practices of multinational corpora-
15. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 8, at 6-7 (footnote omitted).
16. Remarks of Douglas E. Rosenthal, then Ass't Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Anti-
trust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the World Trade Institute, Antitrust Jurisdiction andthe
Activities of Foreign Governments 3 (emphasis added) (Dep't of Justice press release, Jan. 29,
1976) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journa).
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tions which might adversely affect U.S. commerce.
17
The Guide incorporates this expansive view of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction:
[A firm], which has no business activities at all in the US, may be more diffi-
cult to reach under the U.S. antitrust laws, but the Department will try to
include all appropriate defendants in every case. If [the firm] has property in
the United States, it may be seized under certain circumstances to induce
consent to the jurisdiction of a U.S. antitrust court.18
It is evident from the context of these statements and the Guide -partic-
ularly the concern expressed over arrangements affecting international
trade in natural resources 9-- that the enforcement policy elaborated in
these documents represents, at least in part, a reaction to events since 1973.
The application of this enforcement policy appears, however, not to be re-
stricted to the rather extreme disruptions in the petroleum market in 1973-
74. Mr. Davidow has indicated that foreign governmental conduct is objec-
tionable if it has the intended effect of simply raising prices in foreign, in-
cluding U.S., markets.
The last problem, and the most difficult, arises when foreign officials or-
ganize producer nations into international cartels intended to raise the price
of commodities sold to us .... [Tlhe development of such organizations is a
disaster for free competition, world trade and economic development.
... [W]e as a nation are strongly opposed to, and feel injured or
threatened by, the emerging producer cartels.
20
In the present economic environment, however, it is both politically and
economically unrealistic to suggest that foreign governments, which cannot
control the price of their imports, must not act, individually or collectively,
to increase the price of their exports.
What are the possible strategies for the United States? Mr. Davidow dis-
misses diplomacy as ineffective.2 ' Direct suit against the producer nations is
described as "theoretically conceivable, but fraught with difficulties" be-
cause of sovereign immunity and because producer governments
would be likely also to argue that the acts complained of were diplomatic
agreements concerning the most vital natural resources of those states, and
thus were acts of foreign states, which are recognized both in international
law and American law as being beyond question in the courts of another
nation. . . . Thus, it appears that an antitrust case aimed directly at foreign
governments participating in a commodity cartel would be legally difficult
and diplomatically controversial, and perhaps even confrontational.
17. Remarks of Joel Davidow, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, before the Symposium on Private Investments Abroad, Southwe.tern Legal
Foundation, Extraterritorial 4pplication of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing World 8-9 (June
15, 1976) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
18. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 8, at 56 (footnote omitted).
19. See id at 50-61.
20. Remarks of Davidow, supra note 17, at 17-20.
21. See id at 20.
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Yet another alternative, and one somewhat less difficult, involves antitrust
challenge to multinationals based in or with branches in America which co-
operate with and facilitate the carrying out of a foreign-state producer cartel
injuring the U.S. 2 2
These passages enunciate the two reasons why I describe the issue that
has now arisen between the United States and a number of other countries,
including Canada, as a problem with a new dimension. First, the acts com-
plained of are not those of private firms combining for commercial advan-
tage. Rather, they involve the intervention of governments seeking to
protect "the most vital natural resources" of their economies. Second, be-
cause of the difficulties in proceeding directly against foreign governments
in U.S. courts, the proceedings are brought against the multinational corpo-
ration for doing what it was asked to do in the producer state by the govern-
ment of that state. The multinational becomes a conduit for the
extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust law, and the antitrust in-
vestigation and civil or criminal proceeding become unilateral dispute set-
tlement procedures in what is clearly a policy conflict between the producer
and consumer governments.
C. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS AND DOMESTIC LAW
When a manufacturing or resource marketing arrangement that has been
called into existence by producer governments encounters the opposition of
consumer governments, the situation that arises is one of policy differences
or conflicts between governments. And as Lord Wilberforce noted in the
recent House of Lords decision in the Westinghouse case,23 "[i]t is axio-
matic that in anti-trust matters the policy of one state may be to defend
what it is the policy of another state to attack."24 This recognition of the
problem as a dispute between governments is an essential first step in any
progress toward its resolution.
The principal point of this commentary is that in such a situation it is
inappropriate for one of the governments involved in the policy conflict to
seek to impose its desired solution by invoking its domestic law before its
tribunals to adjudicate the legality of conduct in another jurisdiction. The
difference should be resolved, as are other intergovernmental differences,
by consultation and negotiation. Certainly, recent experience has shown
that the use of extraterritorial antitrust investigation, far from preventing
diplomatic controversy and confrontation, tends to exacerbate these
problems and to draw the legislature and the judiciary into the fray as well.
22. Id at 20-22 (footnote omitted).
23. In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.
1977).
24. Id at 94.
1978)
202 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:195
Thus, the resolution of any given international policy conflict by negotia-
tion between governments may be rendered more, rather than less, difficult
when one party seeks to invoke the antitrust "remedy."
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS
The establishment or encouragement by one or more producer countries
of arrangements to regulate production of a commodity and its interna-
tional market price may or may not make good economic sense, depending
on the circumstances affecting trade in the particular commodity; but such
arrangements, when nondiscriminatory, are a perfectly acceptable form of
conduct under international law. Objections to such conduct must therefore
be based on considerations of economic policy, or possibly economic phi-
losophy. They cannot be based, in the international context, on considera-
tions of law.
The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction-upon which the new inter-
national antitrust enforcement policy is based-rests upon a number of fac-
tors which, although possibly valid in the narrow context of U.S. domestic
law, are a good deal more controversial in the international arena, where
the principle of reciprocity functions as a rule of reason in cases ofjurisdic-
tional conflict. Personal jurisdiction may be asserted on the basis of a telex
message or telephone call from abroad to the United States or may be in-
duced through the seizure of property.25 Subject matter jurisdiction can be
asserted on the basis of a very broad interpretation of the "effects" doc-
trine.26 But can a nation such as the United States, with substantial eco-
nomic interests in virtually all parts of the world, reasonably expect other
governments to yield to this assertion of jurisdiction over acts outside the
United States simply because the acts may have had a significant effect on
U.S. domestic or foreign commerce? And what of the situation where the
acts complained of were performed or encouraged by the foreign govern-
ment that is being asked to yield jurisdiction to the United States?
It should be recognized that in the present context these claims to juris-
diction are asserted not to bring within the rule of law persons and activities
that otherwise would be subject to no law, but to displace the jurisdiction of
the state where the acts complained of took place. Those seeking to rely on
these broad claims to jurisdiction are bound by the principle of reciprocity
to consider whether, if the roles were reversed, the United States would be
prepared to yield to a foreign state jurisdiction over acts carried out within
the United States in furtherance of U.S. government policy.
25. SeeANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 8, at 56.
26. This can sometimes occur in a manner that appears to go beyond the objective territorial
principle.
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Where governments or their agencies carry out the acts in question, the
new enforcement policy relies upon a formulation of the principle of sover-
eign immunity recently incorporated in the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976. 27 The new Act provides that "[tihe commercial character
of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct. . . rather than by reference to its purpose."28 This formulation is
narrower than either that enunciated in the Tate letter,29 which represented
U.S. policy prior to the passage of the new Act, or the "restrictive" theory of
sovereign immunity applied by many states. The Guide adopts the nar-
rower view, stating that "[i]n general, foreign firms, including state-owned
or controlled firms, will be expected to observe the prohibitions of our anti-
trust laws." 30 In context, this statement necessarily applies to conduct
outside the United States, including conduct of a state-owned firm in the
state which owns it. The Guide continues:
For example, if [a government] in its capacity as majority shareholder...
required that company's management to organize a commercial cartel, this
may be regarded as a "non-sovereign" act.?1
Since the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act looks at the nature, not
the purpose, of the conduct, it would make no difference that the govern-
ment had acted for the clearly governmental purpose of maintaining the
viability of a vital resource or manufacturing industry. The fact that it had
acted in a commercial context would preclude immunity. It appears that a
similarly restrictive approach will govern the application of the act of state
doctrine.32
A limited interpretation of the defense of foreign compulsion is another
factor upon which the current international antitrust enforcement policy
rests. To sustain this defense, U.S. law appears to require direct foreign
governmental action compelling the defendant's activities.33 This seems to
place the governments of free enterprise economies at a disadvantage in
relation to governments that practice a more interventionist policy. Indeed,
a restrictive application of the foreign compulsion defense would induce
foreign governments to adopt less permissive and more mandatory and in-
flexible forms of intervention in the private sector, including direct inter-
27. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1602-1611,
1391(f), 1441(d) (1976)).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
29. Letter from Jack B. Tate to Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T OF
STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
30. ANTITRUST GuDE, supra note 8, at 9.
31. Id at 55 n.100.
32. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); ANTI-
TRUST GuIDE, sulra note 8, at 54-55.
33. SeeBates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); ANTITRUST GumE, supranote 8, at 54-
55.
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vention in the affairs of U.S. multinationals of a kind to which U.S.
Government representatives have objected in other contexts.34 This kind of
intervention would not be attractive to the private sector. The Canadian
Government would presumably prefer, wherever appropriate, to promote
national economic policies by means that are less interventionist than com-
pulsory legislation. Intervention and coercion may become the lesser of two
evils, however, if the alternative is abdication of the Government's power to
guide the Canadian economy in accordance with Canadian interests.
II
POSSIBLE CANADIAN RESPONSES
For a government such as Canada's, which is affected by the new en-
forcement policy, the issue presented is a simple but fundamental one: will
the Canadian private sector, in matters of Canadian economic policy, be
more responsive to Canadian or to foreign law and policy directives where
the two diverge or even conflict? In formulating responses to the new anti-
trust enforcement policy, the ultimate objective of the Canadian Govern-
ment must be to retain the ability to determine resource and industrial
development policies for Canada. The Government will lose this ability if
the multinationals that play a major role in the Canadian resource and in-
dustrial sectors are more responsive in their Canadian activities to U.S. law
than to Canadian policies and national interests.
A. BLOCKING ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND INTERVENTION TO
PROVIDE IMMUNITY
The responses of affected governments to antitrust investigations and liti-
gation already underway indicate that a number of governments are deeply
concerned over, and will seek to resist, application of U.S. antitrust law
abroad in accordance with the new international enforcement policy. Di-
34. The United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, para. 4(g), 6 (special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) (1974); see Draft
Resolution I, para. 4(g), 6 (special) U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda item 7) 28, U.N. Doc.
A/9556 (1974), asserts that "[r]egulation and supervision of the activities of transnational cor-
porations" are among the powers of host state governments. Developing countries had pro-
posed a text which read "[clontrol of the activities of transnational corporations," Draft
proposal para. 4(f), 6 (special) U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.166/L.47 (1974); see 6 (special)
U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda item 7) 18, U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974), but the U.S. representa-
tive objected to the word "control" because the term implied an excessive degree of govern-
ment intervention, an involvement that went beyond those measures normally exercised by a
government in connection with corporate persons within its jurisdiction. The concept of"reg-
ulation" rather than "control" was carried forward into the United Nations Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, ch. II, art. 2(2)(b), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 31) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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rect responses to the various uranium proceedings35 include legislation in
Australia,36 regulations under the Atomic Energy Control Act 37 and a re-
fusal to act on letters rogatory38 in Canada, and the intervention of the
Attorney General before the House of Lords followed by a decision refus-
ing to execute letters rogatory in the United Kingdom. 39 This reaction has
generated a good deal of concern among U.S. antitrust enforcement author-
ities over what they regard as "stonewalling" and obstructionism by other-
wise friendly governments whose business with the United States is
normally carried on in a manner characterized on both sides by frankness,
openness, and a desire to cooperate as fully as possible in the pursuit of
common objectives. The systematic refusal of information and lack of coop-
eration, especially in the course of judicial proceedings, is therefore particu-
larly puzzling and, one must assume, annoying to U.S. officials.
Canada and the United States provide information to each other freely in
the course of consultation and negotiation to the extent that their laws per-
mit. Both countries assist each other as a matter of course in various kinds
of legal proceedings through the execution of letters rogatory, requests for
extradition, and other procedures. What, then, is the element in the request
for information about uranium marketing, for example, that sets it apart
and leads normally cooperative governments to resist U.S. efforts to obtain
information? I believe the answer is that, unlike the usual requests for infor-
mation, this information is not being sought for purposes of intergovern-
mental consultation or negotiation, a process in which both sides take part
and in which they would exchange information reciprocally. Rather, the
information requested is to be used in a domestic U.S. judicial proceeding.
But unlike normal judicial assistance, this request concerns a proceeding
that the requested governments have reason to believe may be inimical to
their national interests. To be more specific, if the Canadian Government
transmits or permits the transmission of information from Canada to the
United States to assist the prosecution of persons or corporations for acts
done outside the United States at the request or encouragement of the Ca-
nadian Government, then the next time Canada seeks similar cooperation
35. See In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, -[1978] 2 W.L.R. 81
(H.L. 1977).
36. SeeForeign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 21 (Austl.), as
amended by Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976,
No. 202 (Austl.), as implemented by Order of the Attorney General, Austl. Gov't Gaz. No.
S.214 (Nov. 29, 1976).
37. Uranium Information Security Regulations, SOR/77-836, 111 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at 4619
(1977) (replacing Uranium Information Security Regulations, SOR/76-644, 110 Can. Gaz. pt.
II, at 2747 (1976)).
38. .ReWestinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273 (High Ct. Justice
1977).
39. In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.
1977).
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from the private sector of the Canadian economy in the implementation of
national economic policy, it must expect the multinationals in Canada first
to seek the advice of their U.S. legal counsel, and then to comply with the
Canadian request only if compliance will not expose them or their U.S.
affiliates to legal proceedings in the United States. Consequently, if the Ca-
nadian Government is not prepared to accord what protection it can to pri-
vate firms prosecuted abroad for complying with Canadian policy, it cannot
reasonably expect the future cooperation of those firms in carrying out
measures it judges to be in the Canadian economic interest. The private
sector would thus become more responsive to U.S. law than to Canadian
law and policy in determining whether and to what extent it would act in
the Canadian interest. This is not a result that a foreign government can
accept. Nor is it a result that the United States would be likely to accept if
faced with similar conduct by a foreign government holding the same rela-
tive economic "clout" and therefore the same potential for influencing con-
duct within the United States.
In determining how to respond to claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction
that it regards as unreasonable, a government will certainly wish to consider
arming itself with a discretionary power to prevent the removal of informa-
tion that it believes will be used abroad contrary to its national interest. But
attempts to frustrate an investigation, prosecution, or civil litigation already
underway by blocking access to information are generally only partially
successful, and in any event can be no more than a palliative. A good law-
yer's first objective is not to defend his client successfully in court but to
keep him out of court. If the threat of antitrust liability in the United States
is a significant disincentive to compliance with Canadian policy, then the
Canadian Government may also have to consider providing the necessary
"cover," through legislation or other forms of direct intervention, to confer
immunity from antitrust liability. The degree of intervention required for
this purpose will be largely a function of the evolution of the U.S. doctrine
of foreign compulsion. As indicated earlier,4° the more restrictively that
doctrine is applied, the more foreign governments will feel
obliged-whether they like it or not-to subject the private sector to
mandatory rather than flexible control.
B. CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION?
One reason for concern over the publication of the Guide and other offi-
cial statements setting forth the new international enforcement policy is the
effect these policy statements may have on corporate conduct outside the
United States. Antitrust lawyers will rely heavily on these documents when
40. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
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advising their multinational clients on the risk of prosecution in the United
States for acts performed in compliance with host government policy. The
result is that when the conduct in question, even though it takes place
outside the United States, is of a kind to which the new enforcement policy
would apply, there will be a serious disincentive to compliance by multina-
tionals with the measures encouraged by the host government.
The problem facing host governments is how to overcome this disincen-
tive. Recent experience has shown that antitrust prosecutions and the re-
sponses of affected foreign governments have led, if not to confrontation, at
least to an impasse that, if allowed to continue, could escalate into confron-
tation. This is clearly not in the interests of the United States, Canada, or
any other nation. The increasing complexity and interdependence of the
economies of the developed world dictate even closer cooperation among
governments in a number of areas, including the regulation of restrictive
business practices which increasingly cross national boundaries. Therefore,
although unilateral action by affected governments is likely to be part of the
response, it cannot be the only response. There must also be dialogue with
the United States.
Any situation that has already created some obstacles and threatens to
create further obstacles to cooperation in the regulation of restrictive busi-
ness practices is clearly cause for serious concern. This problem has been
recognized at the highest levels of our two governments. Prime Minister
Trudeau and President Carter, at their meeting in Washington in February
1977, agreed that a joint effort should be made to resolve the fundamental
problem which, in the immediately preceding months, had led to three sep-
arate applications of U.S. antitrust law to conduct encouraged or approved
by the Government in Canada. As a result of this meeting, U.S. Attorney
General Griffin B. Bell visited Ottawa in June 1977 to consult with three
Canadian ministers: Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson,
then Minister of Justice Ron Basford, and then Minister of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs Anthony Abbott. The four officials agreed upon general
principles to guide their deputies in working out a notification and consul-
tation procedure in antitrust cases affecting national interests.
These meetings have already produced encouraging results in the form of
public statements by U.S. antitrust enforcement officials recognizing the rel-
evance of the principle of comity to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws. In an address to the American Bar Association in Chicago on
August 8, 1977, Attorney General Bell spoke of comity as a rule of fair play
in international relations:
We owe deference to other nations when their vital national interests are at
stake and the conflicting United States interest carries a lesser weight. But
other nations owe us, in turn, deference at least to the extent of working
toward a compromise arrangement if our fundamental national interests are
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directly affected.41
The Attorney General went on to speak in rather severe terms of foreign
legislation blocking U.S. access to information abroad, but I believe that to
the extent U.S. enforcement policy reflects the basic principle enunciated by
Attorney General Bell, the need to invoke such legislation will largely dis-
appear.
Similarly, in an address to the International Bar Association in Atlanta
on November 3, 1977, Associate Attorney General Michael J. Egan reaf-
firmed the need to take into account conflicting national interests. He also
discussed the possibility that "unyielding" extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust law "could provoke damaging retaliation" which would im-
pair the ability of the Department of Justice "to obtain effective relief as to
foreign conspiracies involving foreign products."'42
I submit that the only appropriate response is one of seeking accommoda-
tion and compromise when United States antitrust enforcement conflicts with
foreign laws and important foreign policies.
The political, economic, and social policies of foreign nations are invoked
not for the purpose of horse-trading---"you stop this investigation and we
will buy United States jet planes"--but to show why it is legally inappropri-
ate to apply United States antitrust law in a particular way and why foreign
law or policy should be more fully taken into account.
"[We are not to read general words, such as those in [the Sherman] Act,
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the
exercise of their powers . . 43
III
OBSERVATIONS
It is customary in articles written by public servants to include a dis-
claimer to the effect that the views expressed are not necessarily those of
their governments. This applies to the whole of this commentary, of course,
but it particularly applies to the following paragraphs, which frankly specu-
late on the possible resolution of the current problem. We are dealing with
a new kind of problem and it is likely that policy on both sides will evolve
as we come to understand each other's concerns better and seek to accom-
modate them in ways that take account of our own national interests.
41. Address by Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney General, before the American Bar Ass'n 6
(Aug. 8, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
42. Address by Michael J. Egan, Assoc. U.S. Attorney General, before the Business Law
Section, International Bar Ass'n 7-8 (Nov. 3, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell
International Law Journal).
43. Id at 8, 12 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d
Cir. 1945)).
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A. DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Achieving a meeting of minds in the area of international antitrust en-
forcement is not an easy task. Even after we dispose of the rhetoric concern-
ing, on the one hand, considerations of national sovereignty and, on the
other, the fundamental importance of the antitrust laws to the national way
of life, there remains a barrier to understanding that is difficult to identify
but is nonetheless very real and often very frustrating. I believe this barrier
arises in part because of a tendency in discussions of this subject to switch
back and forth from consideration of national law to consideration of pol-
icy factors that ought to affect the extraterritorial enforcement of that law,
without always recognizing that these are two related but quite different
subjects. This schizophrenic approach to the problem is an almost unavoid-
able consequence of the fact that the courts, in applying domestic law extra-
territorially, often recognize the relevance of considerations of national
policy and seek to reflect them in their decisions. But ultimately it is the
function of courts to determine and apply domestic law, not foreign policy;
thus concepts such as sovereign immunity, act of state, foreign compulsion,
and possibly even comity, are applied by the courts as domestic law rather
than as foreign policy.
When U.S. officials engage their counterparts from foreign governments
in discussions to identify the limits upon the application of U.S. antitrust
law to conduct outside the United States, both sides recognize that they are
not negotiating the content of U.S. domestic law. For the U.S. representa-
tives the content of U.S. law is not negotiable; for the representatives of the
other nation the content of U.S. domestic law, although it may be part of
the problem, does not provide an acceptable basis in principle for the reso-
lution of differences between governments and is to that extent irrelevant.
This places the U.S. participants in a difficult position: on the one hand,
they are bound to uphold and enforce U.S. law; on the other, they are re-
quired to recognize that there are limits beyond which domestic law ought
not-and possibly cannot-be enforced as to conduct abroad. The determi-
nation of these limits involves to some extent principles of international
law, but to an even greater extent it involves the application by govern-
ments of the principle of international comity as an essential factor in the
conduct of their international relations. Therefore, in discussions of what
the acceptable limits of jurisdiction are or ought to be, any examination of
the domestic case law on extraterritoriality should be conducted in full
awareness of the limitations of its relevance.
To summarize, in any discussion between governments of the rules to
apply on the international plane, the rules of national law, whether statutes
or judicial decisions, cannot be determinative; at best they can suggest the
direction in which common ground might be sought, while at worst they
1978]
210 CORIVELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:195
can be serious obstacles to the application of the principle of comity neces-
sary to any resolution of the problem. One recent U.S. court of appeals
decision that is potentially very helpful in this respect is Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Ameriea" There Judge Choy acknowledged that
at some point the interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign
harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial asser-
tion of jurisdication.
What that point is or how it is determined is not defined by international
law ....
... An effect on United States commerce ... is alone not a sufficient
basis on which to determine whether American authority should be asserted
in a given case as a matter of international comity and fairness ...
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law
or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or
principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement
by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative signifi-
cance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American com-
merce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with
conduct abroad.45
The individual factors identified by the court in Timberlane may be subject
to discussion, but the whole tenor of the court's decision suggests that U.S.
domestic law does indeed contain a rather broad element of discretion in
"foreign interest" cases, from which one may conclude that U.S. representa-
tives do have a basis in their own domestic law for discussing with their
foreign counterparts the application of principles of "international comity
and fairness" to specific cases.
B. NATIONAL POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A state may object to the application of foreign law to conduct within its
territory not only on the bases of sovereignty and generally accepted princi-
ples of international law, but also on the ground that the conduct relates to
a specific national interest and national policy-which is likely to be the
case where the conduct in question has been mandated or encouraged by
the government. In view of the embryonic state of international law in this
area, national interest and policy will often be primary considerations in
situations involving the extraterritorial application of foreign laws. In these
cases, the objecting state would appear to be under an obligation-political
or moral rather than legal-to inform the state seeking to apply its law
44. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
45. Id at 609, 613, 614 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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extraterritorially of what its policy is and, in general terms at least, the
kinds of conduct that it has encouraged in support of that policy.
The state being asked to exercise forbearance in the extraterritorial appli-
cation of its law will wish to assure itself, first, that "national interest" is not
being invoked ex post facto to cloak what was essentially a commercially
motivated combine or a deliberate attempt to evade its law. And second, the
state will wish to examine the general scope of the asserted policy so that it
may identify the conduct, if any, that may have gone beyond what was
necessary or desirable to achieve the identified national interest. The state
objecting to the extraterritorial application of law should be prepared to
provide information concerning these points.
A problem arises, however, if information concerning measures taken by
the objecting state in its national interest that has been provided to the re-
questing state for intergovernmental consultation is used by the authorities
of the requesting state as evidence before its domestic judicial bodies to
support the extraterritorial application of its law. Governments normally
are prepared to discuss their policies with representatives of other friendly
governments affected by those policies. But few, if any, governments will
readily accept the proposition that the importance of their national interests
and the characterization of their activities as governmental or otherwise are
appropriate subjects for determination by a foreign state's judicial bodies.
These are questions that a domestic tribunal may well consider when apply-
ing a domestic law principle of comity in adjudicating a dispute affecting
only private parties, but where governmental policies are called into ques-
tion, the dispute is a matter for intergovernmental consultation, not domes-
tic law adjudication. Because governments may object in principle to this
kind of examination of their policies by foreign courts, they may be reluc-
tant to cooperate in the conduct of such proceedings by providing informa-
tion in support of such an examination. Nor are governments likely to
accept the contention that they are under an obligation to disclose or permit
disclosure of detailed information in their possession or jurisdiction to for-
eign courts in order to attempt to establish innocence under foreign law. To
do so would amount to a recognition of foreign jurisdiction when it is the
very claim to jurisdiction that is disputed.
It is clear, therefore, that a government might readily provide informa-
tion to a friendly government for one purpose but not for another. Conse-
quently, the response to be made to any request for information will depend
not only upon the nature of the information sought but also upon the pur-
pose for which it is sought and the willingness of the requesting state to
ensure that the information will be used only for this purpose. In the ab-
sence of any assurance that the information will not be used in a manner
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inimical to the requested state's national interest, it seems entirely reason-
able that the requested state will decline to provide the information sought.
C. LOOKING BEHIND NATIONAL POLICY
If the conduct under examination was mandated or encouraged by the
government in whose territory the act occurred, it is not at all clear that the
state seeking to apply its law extraterritorially ought to go further and in-
quire into the manner in which the state requiring or encouraging that con-
duct secured the compliance of the private sector with national policy. This
would appear to be entirely an internal matter of the latter state. Systems of
government vary, even among the democracies. The system of separation of
powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches exists in the
United States, with an elaborate network of checks and balances governing
the relationships among the various branches. By contrast, in Canada and
the United Kingdom, the executive holds office by virtue of the support of
the majority in the legislature-specifically, the House of Commons. This
difference has practical consequences. A policy endorsed by the U.S. Ad-
ministration may or may not enjoy the support of Congress. When a Cana-
dian Minister announces Government policy, however, it is recognized that
implementation of that policy can, if necessary, be secured through the en-
actment of legislation by virtue of the Government's majority in Parlia-
ment. But both the Government and the private sector may prefer to avoid
the formality and rigidity of legislation, and compliance with policy may
instead be secured through discussions and voluntary action permitted, but
not compelled, by domestic law. This is a feature of the Canadian system of
government which may differ from that of the United States and which the
doctrine of "foreign compulsion," if rigidly applied, would be unable to
accommodate. Further, this difference illustrates some of the limitations on
extending the experience of the federal-state relationship in the United
States into the international arena. The relationship between the U.S. fed-
eral and state governments is determined by a national constitution, but the
relationship between the United States and foreign governments is not simi-
larly regulated by national law. Although international law is not yet suffi-
ciently developed in this area to provide a corresponding set of rules, it does
not follow that this lacuna in international law should be filled by the appli-
cation of U.S. domestic law.
As mentioned earlier, a state which is asked to exercise forbearance in the
application of its law to conduct outside its territory will wish to assure
itself that the invocation of national interest is made in good faith and not
ex post facto to cloak either commercially motivated anticompetitive con-
duct or a deliberate attempt by a domestic company to evade the state's law
by acting through an affiliate abroad. In determining whether the invoca-
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tion of national interest is made in good faith, however, one must recognize
that serious problems in a vital industry may first be brought to the atten-
tion of the government by the industry itself. And whether the problem is
first identified by industry or by the government, it is very likely that the
government will wish to consult with industry to identify the elements of
the problem and the possible remedies. This form of industry-government
collaboration does not suggest that the government is simply being used as
a tool of industry in the latter's search for commercial advantage. Such col-
laboration is not only entirely consistent with government conduct in the
broad national interest, it is, or should be, a normal step in the process by
which governments formulate industrial policy. Consultation of this kind
should not, therefore, compromise the public character of the government
policy subsequently decided upon or affect how authorities in other coun-
tries view the measures mandated or encouraged by the government to pro-
tect the industry in the public interest.
4 6
CONCLUSION
Canadians and Americans pride themselves on living in societies gov-
erned by the rule of law. But when the extraterritorial application of law
gives rise to competing claims to jurisdiction, such jurisdictional conflicts
cannot be resolved internationally by recourse to national law. When the
46. Professor Baker's implication, see Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends: Canada
andthe (nited States in the Mid-1970s, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165, 191 n.148, that the differ-
ence in our approaches reflects the difference in our professional backgrounds may be correct,
but I doubt that the issue is entirely subjective. We seem to differ on two levels. On the
national level I accept that a court may seek to determine the policy of a foreign government in
order to determine whether the principle of comity is relevant. I do not agree, however, that it
is appropriate for the court, having identified a foreign national policy clearly expressed as
such by the government, to look behind that policy and make the application of the principle
of comity dependent upon whether the manner of the formulation or implementation of the
policy conformed to U.S. domestic procedures. The U.S. system of government reflects U.S.
experiences; those of other states reflect their different experiences. Even among the democra-
cies these differ widely. It would be wrong for one state to use its experience as the criterion
for judging the governmental systems of other states. It is not a matter of displacing the rule
of law, but rather one of identifying which law is relevant and respecting it.
Nor do I seek to displace the rule of law, where it now exists, on the international level. I
do urge that where a transnational antitrust issue is really a manifestation of a policy conflict
between national governments, it should be recognized that there may be no applicable inter-
national law to resolve the conflict. In such cases resolution should be sought through the
normal methods of consultation and negotiation. For one government to seek to resolve the
conflict in its favor by invoking its national law before its domestic tribunals is not the rule of
law but an application, in judicial guise, of the principle that economic might is right, a con-
cept that ought to be even more repugnant to lawyers than to diplomats.
If any potential private cartelizers read in this an invitation to seek a governmental "cover"
for private anticompetitive conduct, I urge them not to act on that understanding. It could be
very expensive. A government that invoked "national interest" where none existed would
thereby forfeit its ability to invoke that interest in later cases. This is a powerful incentive to
play the game fairly.
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competing jurisdictional claims essentially reflect divergent or even con-
flicting national policies, recourse to the national law and domestic judici-
ary of one of the disputants is an inappropriate means of resolving the
conflict. In an ideal world, international disputes of this kind could be re-
solved by reference to international law and, if necessary, international ju-
dicial or other dispute settlement procedures. But the present state of
international law is inadequate for this task. This commentary has sought
to demonstrate that the current differences over the extraterritorial applica-
tion of antitrust law must be recognized as policy issues rather than as legal
issues and dealt with accordingly. This is certainly not to suggest that the
regulation of differences of this kind is not a proper subject for international
law. On the contrary, the challenge facing the representatives of govern-
ments now involved in consultations to resolve these issues is to identify
principles governing the extraterritorial application of antitrust law that
will be generally acceptable to states engaged in or affected by such con-
duct. These principles, if they are agreed upon and respected, can provide
the basis for a pattern of state conduct which could very well evolve into a
body of customary international law in this area of large and growing im-
portance to an economically complex and interdependent world. The moti-
vation to succeed in this endeavor is provided, first, by our common
recognition that it is in the national interests of both our countries to main-
tain and increase our cooperation in the field of antitrust enforcement, and
second, by our mutual desire that our relations in this area reflect the spirit
of constructive good neighborliness which is the hallmark of our relation-
ship.
